

# TAKING SECURITY SERIOUSLY

**DR. PHILIPPE DE RYCK** 

https://Pragmatic Web Security.com

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# We Take Your Privacy and Security. Seriously.

#### September 29, 2014

135 Comments

"Please note that [COMPANY NAME] takes the security of your personal data very seriously." If you've been on the Internet for any length of time, chances are very good that you've received at least one breach notification email or letter that includes some version of this obligatory line. But as far as lines go, this one is about as convincing as the classic break-up line, "It's not you, it's me."



# WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO TAKE SECURITY SERIOUSLY?



#### I am Dr. Philippe De Ryck



**Founder of Pragmatic Web Security** 



#### **Google Developer Expert**



#### Auth0 Ambassador



SecAppDev organizer

#### I help developers with security



Hands-on in-depth security training



Advanced online security courses



Security advisory services



https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com

Giving the browser a snippet of code mixed with data

- 1 let data = "" + review + ""
- 2 document.getElementById("msg").innerHTML = data

innerHTML relies on the browser's code parser to handle the data

#### A review submitted by a malicious user

- 1 This restaurant is highly recommended. The food
- 2 is exquisite and the service is impeccable.<img</pre>
- 3 src="none.png" onerror="alert('Go there, now!')">





Giving the browser a snippet of code mixed with data

1 let data = "" + review + ""

2 document.getElementById("msg").innerHTML = data

innerHTML relies on the browser's code parser to handle the data

Giving the browser code and data with context information

- 1 let p = document.createElement("p")
- 2 p.textContent = review
- 3 document.getElementById("msg").appendChild(p)

#### A review submitted by a malicious user

- 1 This restaurant is highly recommended. The food
- 2 is exquisite and the service is impeccable.<imp</p>
- 3 src="none.png" onerror="alert('Go there, now!')">

Using the proper DOM APIs provides the browser with context, avoiding the confusion that leads to XSS

#### https://restograde.com

#### Absolutely awesome

This restaurant is **highly recommended**. The food is exquisite and the service is impeccable. <img src="none.png" onerror="alert('Go there, now!')">

#### 1 \$("#reviews").append(`\${review}</div>`);

••• ()   jQuery AP	• • • • () append()   jQuery AP	••• • ()   jQuery AP	• • • • • .append()   jQuery API Docume ×	+	
$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ $\mathcal{C}$ (i) Not Secure   a	$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ C (i) Not Secure   a	$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ C (i) Not Secure   a	$\leftarrow$ $\rightarrow$ $C$ (i) Not Secure   api.jquery.cd	om/append/	Ê
U V 두 🗢 💷	<ul> <li>Deprecated 1.9</li> <li>Deprecated 1.10</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Class Attribute</li><li>Copying</li></ul>	<ul><li>Attribute</li><li>Basic</li></ul>	<pre>3 existingdiv1 = document.getElementById( "too" ); 4 5 \$( "body" ).append( \$newdiv1, [ newdiv2, existingdiv1 ] );</pre>	
	<ul><li>Deprecated 3.0</li><li>Deprecated 3.3</li></ul>	<ul><li>DOM Insertion, Around</li><li>DOM Insertion, Inside</li><li>DOM Insertion, Outside</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Basic Filter</li> <li>Child Filter</li> <li>Content Filter</li> </ul>	Since .append() can accept any number of additional arguments, the same result can be achieved I passing in the three <div>s as three separate arguments, like so: \$('body').append( \$newdiv1, newdiv2, existingdiv1). The type and number of arguments will largely depend on how you collect the elements in your code.</div>	by ect
Download API Documen	Dimensions     Effects	DOM Removal	• Form	Additional Notes:	
	<ul><li>Basics</li></ul>	<ul><li>DOM Replacement</li><li>General Attributes</li></ul>	<ul><li>Hierarchy</li><li>jQuery Extensions</li></ul>	<ul> <li>By design, any jQuery constructor or method that accepts an HTML string — jQuery(), <u>append</u> <u>.after()</u>, etc. — can potentially execute code. This can occur by injection of script tags or use of</li> </ul>	<u>10,</u> f
<ul> <li>Ajax</li> <li>Global Ajax Event Hanc</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Custom</li><li>Fading</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Style Properties</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Visibility Filter</li> </ul>	HTML attributes that execute code (for example, <img onload=""/> ). Do not use these method insert strings obtained from untrusted sources such as URL query parameters, cookies, or form inputs. Doing so can introduce cross-site-scripting (XSS) vulperabilities. Bemove or escape app	is to n
Helper Functions	<ul> <li>Sliding</li> </ul>	Miscellaneous     Collection Manipulation	Traversing     Fittacian	user input before adding content to the document.	citly
<ul> <li>Shorthand Methods</li> </ul>	Events	<ul> <li>Data Storage</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Filtering</li><li>Miscellaneous Traversing</li></ul>	documented for that method, might cause unexpected behaviors. Examples of methods that support SVG as of jQuery 3.0 are addClass and removeClass.	illy
Attributes	<ul><li>Browser Events</li><li>Document Loading</li></ul>	<ul><li>DOM Element Methods</li><li>Setup Methods</li></ul>	Tree Traversal	Examples:	
<ul> <li>Callbacks Object</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Event Handler Attachm</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Utilities</li> </ul>	Appends some HTML to all paragraphs.	
Core	<ul> <li>Event Object</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Offset</li> </ul>	Version		
CSS	<ul> <li>Form Events</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Properties</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Version 1.0</li> </ul>	2 <html lang="en"></html>	
Data	<ul> <li>Keyboard Events</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Properties of jQuery Ob</li> </ul>	Version 1.0.4	3 <head> 4 <meta charset="utf-8"/></head>	
<ul> <li>Deferred Object</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mouse Events</li> </ul>	Instances	Version 1.1	5 <title>append demo</title> 6 <style></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><ul>     <li>Deprecated</li> </ul></td><td></td><td><ul>     <li>Properties of the Globa Object</li> </ul></td><td>Version 1.1.2</td><td>7 p { 8 background: yellow;</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Deprecated 1.3</td><td>Forms</td><td></td><td>Version 1.1.3</td><td>9 } 10 </style>	
<ul> <li>Deprecated 1.7</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Internals</li> </ul>	Removed	Version 1.1.4	<pre>11 <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-1.10.2.js"></script> 12 </pre>	
<ul> <li>Deprecated 1.8</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Manipulation</li> </ul>	Selectors	Version 1.2	13 <body></body>	
• Deprecated 1.9	<ul> <li>Class Attribute</li> </ul>	Attribute	<ul> <li>Version 1.2.3</li> </ul>	15 I would like to say:	

# **UNDERSTAND YOUR LIBRARIES**



Libraries and frameworks are not always secure out of the box. Understanding how your library of choice handles security is crucial.







# {myDirtyData}}



1 <div>

- 2 <h3>{{ review.title }}</h3>
- 3 {{ review.content }}
- 4 </div>

#### A review submitted by a malicious user

- 1 This restaurant is <b>highly recommended</b>. The
- 2 food is exquisite and the service is impeccable. <a</pre>
- 3 href="https://pics.example.com">Check out my story
- 4 here!</a><img src="none.png" onerror="alert('Go</pre>
- 5 there, now!')">

#### By default, Angular escapes values embedded in a template before rendering them

#### https://restograde.com

#### Absolutely awesome

This restaurant is <b>highly recommended</b>. The food is exquisite and the service is impeccable. <a href="https://pics.example.com">Check out my story here!</a><img src="none.png" onerror="alert('Go there, now!')">



- 1 <div>
- 2 <h3>{{ review.title }}</h3>
- 3
- 4 </div>

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- 3 href="https://pics.example.com">Check out my story
- 4 here!</a><img src="none.png" onerror="alert('Go</pre>

5 there, now!')">

Binding HTML into the page with Angular is secure by default *[innerHTML]* does not directly expose *innerHTML* property, but sanitizes the data first

#### https://restograde.com

Absolutely awesome

This restaurant is **highly recommended**. The food is exquisite and the service is impeccable. <u>Check out my story here!</u>





# trustAsHtml(myDirtyData)





# trustAsHtml (myDirtyData)

## bypassSecurityTrustHtml(myDirtyData)



## MAKE INSECURITY EXPLICIT



Explicitly marking features as insecure helps prevent accidental misuse and simplifies code scanning efforts





#### The only way to allow style attributes is to bypass sanitization

1 <div [innerHTML]="sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustHtml(data)"></div>

This code completely disables the sanitizer, creating a massive vulnerability in the application



```
@Pipe({
 1
      name: 'sanitizeWithStyle'
 2
    })
 3
    export class SanitizeWithStylePipe implements PipeTransform {
 4
 5
      constructor(private sanitizer : DomSanitizer) {}
 6
 8
      transform(html: string) : SafeHtml {
                                                                                    This use of
 9
      // Allowing CSS is still not recommended
                                                                            bypassSecurityTrustHtml can
      return this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustHtml(
10
                                                                           be marked as checked, so code
               DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {ADD ATTR: ['style']}));
11
                                                                               scanning tools ignore it
12
      }
              DOMPurify sanitizes the data, but is
13
   }
               configured to allow style attributes
```

The application code no longer calls bypassSecurityTrustHtml directly

1 <div [innerHTML]="data | sanitizeWithStyle"></div>

Allowing style information can still result in attacks, so use a pattern like this with care

## **SETUP DEVELOPERS FOR SECURITY SUCCESS**



#### Secure-by-default frameworks reduce the need for knowledge

#### Subtle security nudges reduce the risk of mistakes

Encapsulate dangerous functions and use linting to prevent direct usage





A page enabling a **Trusted Types** policy in a response header

```
Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'
2
```

```
3
   document.querySelector("#data").innerHTML = "<b>Hello world!</b>" + data;
```

**Enabling Trusted Types eliminates an entire** class of XSS vulnerabilities

When *Trusted Types* is enabled, text-to-code sinks like *innerHTML* throw a TypeError



Trusted Types does not affect the use of proper DOM APIs

```
1 Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'
```

```
2
```

- 3 let msg = document.createElement("span");
- 4 msg.setAttribute("class", "italic");
- 5 msg.innerText = e.data;
- 6 document.getElementById("msg").appendChild(msg);

InnerHTML can still be used, as long as it is assigned a Trusted Type value

```
1 Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'
2
3 let safeData = DOMPurify.sanitize("<b>Hello world!</b>" + data, {RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true});
4 document.querySelector("#data").innerHTML = safeData;

The safe value can now be assigned to
    innerHTML, because it is properly
    sanitized by DOMPurify
    DOMPurify has built-in support for Trusted
    Types, and can be instructed to return the data
    as a TrustedHTML value instead of a string
```

# Trusted Types for DOM manipulation

An API that forces developers to be very explicit about their use of powerful DOMinjection APIs. Can greatly improve security against XSS attacks.



Usage	% of	all users	\$ ?
Global		70.93%	





#### Enable trusted types by setting a CSP policy

1 Content-Security-Policy: trusted-types angular; require-trusted-types-for 'script'



The browser now refuses to assign unsafe content to innerHTML

1 this.div.nativeElement.innerHTML = this.inputValue;

> Uncaught TypeError: Failed to set the <u>index.js:1</u> 'innerHTML' property on 'Element': This document requires 'TrustedHTML' assignment. at HTMLIFrameElement.e.onload (<u>index.js:1</u>) at fe (<u>index.js:1</u>) at <u>index.js:1</u> at <u>index.js:1</u>



#### Enable trusted types by setting a CSP policy

- 1 Content-Security-Policy:
- 2 trusted-types angular angular#unsafe-bypass; require-trusted-types-for 'script'



The browser still refuses to assign unsafe content to innerHTML

1 this.div.nativeElement.innerHTML = this.inputValue;

S > Uncaught TypeError: Failed to set the <u>index.js:1</u> 'innerHTML' property on 'Element': This document requires 'TrustedHTML' assignment. at HTMLIFrameElement.e.onload (<u>index.js:1</u>) at fe (<u>index.js:1</u>) at <u>index.js:1</u> at <u>index.js:1</u>

## **USE PLATFORM-LEVEL SECURITY FEATURES**



Building applications on a secure platform offers a significant advantage Trusted Types prevents dangerous DOM manipulations that lead to XSS A secure platform not only covers the application, but also its dependencies









## of code in a modern web app are dependencies



- \$ ng new clean-app
- ? Would you like to add Angular routing? Yes
- ? Which stylesheet format would you like to use? Sass

added 1169 packages from 1030 contributors and audited 42445 packages in 28.75s

#### \$ cloc node\_modules/

Language	files	blank	comment	code
JavaScript	12683	145344	525680	1773037
JSON	1555	104	0	161571
Markdown	1385	65564	4	157446
TypeScript	2892	9625	90588	104376
HTML	274	1656	218	33724
CSS	148	299	2301	22382
C++	75	3784	3501	22332
Python	51	4205	7606	18695
C/C++ Header	101	2758	1858	15114
LESS	482	1611	410	11321
XML	20	3237	1300	7617
YAML	163	140	112	2416
Bourne Shell	18	292	333	1500
SVG	8	2	2	776
make	30	236	39	715
Windows Module Definition	7	115	0	641
DTD	1	179	177	514
SUM:	19983	239598	634354	2336228

- \$ ng new clean-app
- ? Would you like to add Angular routing? Yes
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added 1169 packages from 1030 contributors and audited 42445 packages in 28.75s





# **Follow** ~

**Owner** 

# NPM library with 2m installs has a backdoor, looks to be some kind of Trojan (stealer?)



dominictarr commented 5 days ago

he emailed me and said he wanted to maintain the module, so I gave it to him. I don't get any thing from maintaining this module, and I don't even use it anymore, and havn't for years.





## of packages rely on known vulnerable code\*

*\*estimated by the authors of* 



Small world with high risks: a study of security threats in the npm ecosystem

=== npm audit security report ===		
Run npm update handlebarsdepth 7 to resolve 1 vulnerability		
High	Prototype Pollution	
Package	handlebars	
Dependency of	react-scripts [dev]	
Path	react-scripts > jest > jest-cli > @jest/core > @jest/reporters > istanbul-reports > handlebars	
More info	https://npmjs.com/advisories/1164	

bash

℃第1

found 1 high severity vulnerability in 905626 scanned packages
 run `npm audit fix` to fix 1 of them.



.



Dependency-Check is an open source tool performing a best effort analysis of 3rd party dependencies; false positives and false negatives may exist in the analysis performed by the tool. Use of the tool and the reporting provided constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition, and there are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to the analysis or its use. Any use of the tool and the reporting provided is at the user's risk. In no event shall the copyright holder or OWASP be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use of this tool, the analysis performed, or the resulting report.

#### How to read the report | Suppressing false positives | Getting Help: google group | github issues

#### **Project: Restograde**

Scan Information (show all):

- dependency-check version: 4.0.0
- Report Generated On: Dec 5, 2018 at 09:43:02 +01:00
- Dependencies Scanned: 1217 (1048 unique)
- Vulnerable Dependencies: 10
- Vulnerabilities Found: 10
- Vulnerabilities Suppressed: 0
- ...



#### *Equifax* uses *Apache Struts 2* to build applications



@PhilippeDeRyck



## of vulnerabilities occur in indirect dependencies



Pulse	Dependency graph
Contributors	
Traffic	Dependencies Dependents
Commits	A We found potential security vulnerabilities in your dependencies.
Code frequency	Dependencies defined in these manifest files have known security vulnerabilities and should be updated:
Dependency graph	restograde-angular/package-lock.json 5 vulnerabilities found reviewer-angular/package-lock.json 5 vulnerabilities found
Alerts	See security alerts
Network	Only the owner of this repository can see this message.
Forks	Learn more about vulnerability alerts

These dependencies are defined in **pws-restograde**'s manifest files, such as **reviewer-angular/package-lock.json**, **reviewer-angular/package.json**, and **restograde-angular/package-lock.json**.

# Snyk for Developers & DevOps

Snyk continuously monitors your application's dependencies and lets you quickly respond when new vulnerabilities are disclosed.

#### Fix your vulnerabilities



- Single click fix generate a fix PR from UI, CLI wizard
- Upgrade Automatically calculates the minimal direct dependency version upgrade needed
- Precision patch Use patches backported by Snyk security team to fix when direct upgrade is not available or it'll take time to have upgrade implemented
- Automatic fix for new vulnerabilities Automatically generate fix pull requests for newly discovered vulnerabilities

# SECURE YOUR DEPENDENCY GRAPH



#### Setup dependency monitoring for all your projects

#### Patch your software, both continuously and urgently

Focus on the dependencies that matter





# **EMPOWER PEOPLE TO TAKE SECURITY SERIOUSLY**



# IN-DEPTH ONLINE COURSES TO HELP YOU TAKE SECURITY SERIOUSLY



### https://courses.pragmaticwebsecurity.com





# THANK YOU!

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@PhilippeDeRyck

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