



# SERVING THE RIGHT RECIPE FOR API AUTHENTICATION

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DR. PHILIPPE DE RYCK


<https://PragmaticWebSecurity.com>


**Authentication is providing proof that  
a party is who they claim to be**

**Authorization relies on authentication  
to decide if an operation is allowed or not**









## \$1 NYC Pizza Slice

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## Tickets (Barcelona, Spain) – Fun, Innovative T Hype

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This was way cuter when I pictured it in my head



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@PhilippeDeRyck



I am *Dr. Philippe De Ryck*



Founder of Pragmatic Web Security



Google Developer Expert



Auth0 Ambassador / Expert



SecAppDev organizer

I help developers with security



Academic-level security training



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
Security advisory services




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# BASIC CLIENT AUTHENTICATION








1 The client includes their credentials on every request

```
1 GET /restaurants HTTP/1.1
2 Host: restograde.com
3 Authorization: Basic bXlDbGllbnQ6dGhlQ2xpZW50U2VjcmV0
```

The client credentials are included in the HTTP Authorization header

The value consists of "username:password" in base64



1 *The secret is an API key included in every request*


```
1 GET /restaurants HTTP/1.1
2 Host: restograde.com
3 X-API-Key: fd2bcd6eab56417f81332c109e0d67eb
```

The API key is included in a custom request header



# SENDING A SHARED SECRET

- *Basic authentication / API keys*
- *Secret added by sender, verified by API*
- *Secret is often hardcoded*
- *Works well between services*



## BENEFITS

Lightweight mechanism with minimal overhead

Easy to implement

Works well within a single "*trust zone*"

## DRAWBACKS

Secret has to be known by all involved parties

Scalable secret management is challenging

Secret is not linked to the request in any way




**2** *The client authenticates the request with an HMAC*

```
1 GET /restaurants HTTP/1.1
2 Host: restograde.com
3 X-Req-Sig: 5d672d79c15b13162d927...e06b5924a6f2b5d7
```


The HMAC is included in a custom request header

The HMAC is based on the request and the secret value

# INTERMEZZO: HMACs



# INTERMEZZO: HMACs





## 2 Signing AWS requests with Signature Version 4

```
1 GET /?Action=ListUsers&Version=2010-05-08 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: iam.amazonaws.com
3 X-amz-date: 20150830T123600Z
4 Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AKIDEXAMPLE/20150830/us-east-1/iam/aws4_request,
5 SignedHeaders=content-type;host;x-amz-date,
6 Signature=5d672d79c15b13162d9279b0855cfba6789a8edb4c82c400e06b5924a6f2b5d7
```

The **Authorization** header also includes the metadata about the HMAC



2 The client authenticates the request with a JWT

```
1 GET /restaurants HTTP/1.1
2 Host: restograde.com
3 X-Req-JWT: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ...
```

The JWT is included in a custom request header

## INTERMEZZO: JWTs

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkJoaWxpcHB1IER1IFJ5Y2siLCJyb2x1cyI6InVzZXIgcmlvdGF1cmFudG93bmVyIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.KPjhyE9oi83uehgw6Lm\_0yAZzRuJhcUqXETD2A

# Encoded

PASTE A TOKEN HERE

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdGF1cmFudG93bmVyaWwifQ.KPjhyE9oi83uehgw6Lm\_0yAZzRuJhcUqXETD2AIrF2A

Base64-encoded

Contains a set of claims

Integrity-protected with a signature

# Decoded

EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```

PAYLOAD: DATA

```
{
  "sub": "1234567890",
  "name": "Philippe De Ryck",
  "roles": "user restaurantowner",
  "iat": 1516239022
}
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

HMACSHA256(  
base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +  
base64UrlEncode(payload),  

SuperSecretHMACKey

  
) ☐ secret base64 encoded



# ADDING AN HMAC IN THE REQUEST

- *HTTP Signatures / Custom JWTs*
- *HMACs are calculated on a piece of data using a shared secret*
- *HMACs ensure the integrity of the data*



## BENEFITS

HMACs provide data authenticity and integrity

Relatively easy to implement

Signature can be uniquely tied to a specific request

## DRAWBACKS


Secret has to be known by all involved parties

Scalable secret management is challenging


HMAC verification requires (application) code

# ADVANCED CLIENT AUTHENTICATION






# INTERMEZZO: DIGITAL SIGNATURES



# INTERMEZZO: DIGITAL SIGNATURES





## 2 Signing requests with the HTTP Signature specification

```
1 GET /restaurants HTTP/1.1
2 Host: restograde.com
3 Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 07:28:00 GMT
4 Signature: keyId="clientPubKey", algorithm="rsa-sha256", created=1402170695, expires=1402170995,
5 headers="host date", signature="T1l3tWH2cSP31nfuvvc3nVaHQ6IAu9YLEXgTXnlWbgKtBTa...gd9rGnCHtAg=="
```

The **Signature** header also includes the metadata about the used key and the signature contents



**2** *The client authenticates the request with a JWT*

```
1 GET /restaurants HTTP/1.1
2 Host: restograde.com
3 Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ...
```

The **Authorization** header includes a client-generated JWT

The client can include arbitrary request metadata in the JWT

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)  
Request for Comments: 7523  
Category: Standards Track  
ISSN: 2070-1721

M. Jones  
Microsoft  
B. Campbell  
Ping Identity  
C. Mortimore  
Salesforce  
May 2015

**JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile  
for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants**

**Abstract**

This specification defines the use of a JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Token as a means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for client authentication.





# ASYMMETRIC REQUEST SIGNATURES

- *HTTP Signatures / Custom JWTs*
- *Created with the sender's private key*
- *Verified with the sender's public key*
- *Signatures ensure the validity of the data*



## BENEFITS

Only the public key needs to be shared (no secrets)

Works well when one client relies on multiple APIs


Cryptographic keys can be stored securely

## DRAWBACKS

Key management / trustworthiness is challenging


Only provides authenticity (and data integrity)

Integrity protection only applies to the signed data



# USING AN mTLS CONNECTION

- *Client and server have a TLS certificate*
- *During the handshake, client and server verify trustworthiness of certificates*
- *Recommended for native applications*



## BENEFITS

mTLS offers confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity

Supported in most languages / frameworks

Works with self-signed certificates if they are trusted

## DRAWBACKS

mTLS does not work well with browser-based apps

Certificate and key management (PKI) is challenging

No further data besides the info from the certificate

# RFC 8705

## OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens

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### Abstract

This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual-TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.



# Amazon API Gateway now supports mutual TLS authentication

Posted On: Sep 17, 2020

Amazon API Gateway now supports mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication. Customers can now enable mTLS on custom domain names for regional REST and HTTP APIs at no additional cost. Mutual TLS enhances the security of your API and helps protect your data from attacks such as client spoofing or man-in-the middle attacks.

Historically, API Gateway has supported one-way TLS to ensure that API clients are able to verify API Gateway's identity by validating its public certificate. With this new feature, customers can now configure a custom domain name to enforce two-way TLS or mTLS which enables certificate-based authentication both ways: client-to-server and server-to-client. This helps you comply with security requirements for your Open Banking solution or easily authenticate devices in an IOT solution.


This new feature is generally available in all [regions where API Gateway is available](#). To learn more you can read the [documentation](#). For more information about Amazon API Gateway, visit our [product page](#).



@PhilippeDeRyck


<https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2020/09/amazon-api-gateway-supports-mutual-tls-authentication/>

# ISTIO SUPPORTS AUTOMATIC mTLS CONFIGURATIONS



# USER AUTHENTICATION








# COOKIE-BASED “AUTHENTICATION”

- *The user authenticates once*
- *Authentication state is tracked for the duration of a “session”*
- *Supports both stateful and stateless backend scenarios*



## BENEFITS

Cookies are handled automatically by the browser

Supported by most backend frameworks


Modern browsers support advanced cookie security

## DRAWBACKS

Cookies only work well in browser-based applications

Cookies only work well within a single domain

Suggesting the use of cookies makes you look uncool



The client can be a frontend web app, a backend web app, or a native application

4 The client includes the token in each request

1 GET `/restaurants` HTTP/1.1


2 Host: `restograde.com`

3 Authorization: `Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ...`



# TOKEN-BASED “AUTHENTICATION”

- *The user authenticates once*
- *Authentication state is represented by a token (typically a JWT)*
- *The client sends the token on every request to the API*



## BENEFITS

Works well for all clients, including JS applications

Works well within a single application


Suggesting the use of tokens makes you look cool

## DRAWBACKS

Typically requires custom backend code to handle

Long-lived tokens are dangerous

Token security in browser-based applications is hard



eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6Ikk5UVkJPVFUzTXpCQk9FVXd0emhCUTBWR01rUTBRVVU1UVRZeFFVZXlPVU5FUVVVeE5qRXlNdyJ9

.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3N0cy5yZXN0b2dyYWRlLmNvbS8iLCJzdWIiOiJhdXRoMHw1ZWI5MTZjMjU4YmRiNTBiZjIwMzY2YzYiLCJhdWQiOiIsiaHR0cHM6Ly9hcGkuYmVzdG9ncmFkZS5jb20iLCJodHRwczovL3Jlc3RvZ3JhZGUuZXUuYXV0aDAuY29tL3VzZXJpbmZvIl0sIm1hdCI6MTU40Tc3NTA3MiwiaXhwIjoxNTg5ODYxNDcyLCJhenAiOiJPTET0bjM4OVNVSW11ZkV4Z1JHNVJpbExTZ2RZeHdFcCI6IjNjb3BlIjoib3Blbm1kIHByb2ZpbGUuZW1haWwgb2ZmbGluZV9hY2Nlc3MifQ.XzJ0XtTX0G0SbCFvp4yZGJzh7Xhm0mI2XxtjWdl0Dz\_siI-u8h11elcr8LwX6-hL20Q0W0eStzBzmm1FM\_tS7MxuKkYx8QlTWOURPembVKZOhNi8kN-1j0pyc0uzve7Jib5vcxmKpwqpcVDFACgP85\_0NYe4zXHKxCA5\_8V0n05cRCDSkNMtFzGJCT9ipCcNXaVGdksojYGqQzezjpzzzwrtPEkiyFLftDPZA10MleF3oFA0CBK0UKuNjJ\_cSBbUsaIwfvK0WH47AwFrRn\_TxL4S1P3j3b1GgBm8tAqXysY84VZu0rSg3zrZj1PnoqPD4mb0Xds20xafCr9wR4WTQ

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE
<pre>"alg": "RS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": "NTVBOTU3MzBB0EUwNzhBQ0VGmkQ0QUU5QTYxQUUyOUNEQUUxNjEzMw" }</pre>
PAYLOAD: DATA
<pre>{   "iss": "https://sts.restograde.com/",   "sub": "auth0 5eb916c258bdb50bf20366c6",   "aud": [     "https://api.restograde.com",     "https://restograde.eu.auth0.com/userinfo"   ],   "iat": 1589775072,   "exp": 1589861472,   "azp": "OLKNn389SUImufExgRG1RilLSgdYxwEp",   "scope": "openid profile email offline_access" }</pre>

#### HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
"alg": "RS256",  
"typ": "JWT",  
"kid":  
"NTVBOTU3MzBB0EUwNzhBQ0VGmkQ0QUU5QTYxQUUyOUNEQUUxNjEYMw"  
}
```

#### PAYLOAD: DATA

```
{  
  "iss": "https://sts.restograde.com/",  
  "sub": "auth0|5eb916c258bdb50bf20366c6",  
  "aud": [  
    "https://api.restograde.com",  
    "https://restograde.eu.auth0.com/userinfo"  
  ],  
  "iat": 1589775072,  
  "exp": 1589861472,  
  "azp": "OLKNn389SUImufExgRG1RilLSgdYxwEp",  
  "scope": "openid profile email offline_access"  
}
```

The **sub** claim represents the user's unique identifier

The **aud** claim represents the target APIs for this access token


The **exp** claim represents the lifetime of the token

The **azp** claim represents the client to which this token was issued



# USING OAUTH 2.0 ACCESS TOKENS

- *OAuth 2.0 allows clients to access APIs on behalf of users*
- *OAuth 2.0 supports access & refresh tokens*
- *OAuth 2.0 offers uniform support for different types of clients*



## BENEFITS

Uniform authorization framework for various clients

Well-defined threat model / security considerations

Ecosystem of libraries to simplify implementation


## DRAWBACKS

Complex to manage in a simple architecture

User authentication typically involves the browser

OAuth 2.0 is an extensive but complicated framework

# This online course condenses dozens of confusing specs into a crystal-clear academic-level learning experience



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `courses.pragmaticwebsecurity.com/bundles/mastering-oauth-oidc`. The page header features the Pragmatic Web Security logo (a green shield with a white figure) and the text "Pragmatic Web Security" and "Security for developers". A "SIGN IN" link is visible in the top right. The main content area has the title "Mastering OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect" and the subtitle "Your shortcut towards understanding OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect". Below this, a paragraph states: "OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect are crucial for securing web applications, mobile applications, APIs, and microservices. Unfortunately, getting a good grip on the purpose and use cases for these technologies is insanely difficult. As a result, **many implementations use incorrect configurations or contain security vulnerabilities.**"

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<https://courses.pragmaticwebsecurity.com>



**Sending a shared secret**  
**Adding an HMAC in the request**

Simple client authentication mechanism that only works well in a single trust zone

**Asymmetric request signatures**

Simple client authentication mechanism that does not rely on shared secrets

**Using an mTLS connection**

**Recommended for service-to-service communication** to establish a secure channel

**Cookie-based “authentication”**

**Recommended to track authentication state within a single web application architecture**

**Token-based “authentication”**

Mainly useful within a single app. **Not recommended without revocable refresh tokens/sessions**

**Using OAuth 2.0 access tokens**

Complex but extensive authorization framework.  
**Recommended to support multiple clients and APIs**

# USEFUL REFERENCES

- AWS request signing: [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/sigv4\\_signing.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/sigv4_signing.html)
- HTTP Signatures: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00>
- Client authentication with JWT in OAuth 2.0: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7523>
- Client authentication with mTLS in OAuth 2.0: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8705>
- Istio security architecture: <https://istio.io/v1.3/docs/concepts/security/>
- Additional talks on API security: <https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/talks.html>
- Online courses: <https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/courses.html>





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