

# GETTING API SECURITY RIGHT

DR. PHILIPPE DE RYCK


https://Pragmatic Web Security.com

#### **Business**

# Mobile Health Apps Systematically Expose PII and PHI Through APIs, New Findings from Knight Ink and Approov Show

9 February 2021, 12:00 CET

https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2021-02-09/mobile-health-apps-systematically-expose-pii-and-phi-through-apis-new-findings-from-knight-ink-and-approov-show



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100 percent of API endpoints tested were vulnerable to BOLA attacks that allowed the researcher to view the PII and PHI for patients that were not assigned to the researcher's clinician account.

### START TAKING SECURITY SERIOUSLY



The cowboy years are over. Security is a crucial requirement for every application from day 1, and not an afterthought for a quiet period.

#### I am Dr. Philippe De Ryck



**Founder of Pragmatic Web Security** 



**Google Developer Expert** 



**Auth0 Ambassador** 



SecAppDev organizer

#### I help developers with security



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https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com

# Reverse Engineering Bumble's API

When you have too much time on your hands and want to dump out Bumble's entire user base and bypass paying for premium Bumble Boost features.











Our accounts eventually got locked and hidden for more verification requirements. We tested retrieving user data while our account was locked, and it still worked.

"

It's possible to view deleted fleets via Twitter's API endpoint, to view existing fleets without giving the poster a read notification and you can do both without being logged into Twitter.





full disclosure: scraping fleets from public accounts without triggering the read notification

the endpoint is: api.twitter.com/fleets/v1/user...

12:51 AM · Nov 21, 2020 · Twitter Web App

528 Retweets 226 Quote Tweets 1.4K Likes



cathode gay tube @donk\_enby · Nov 21

Replying to @donk\_enby

for auth you just use the same leaked consumer keys from official twitter app that lets you use firehose for free: gist.github.com/shobotch/51600...

ddg api.twitter.com/auth/1/xauth\_p... for how to get a token



# THE CLIENT IS IRRELEVANT FOR SECURITY



The attack surface of an API consists of all accessible endpoints, regardless of how and if they are used by the client

# A security flaw in Grindr let anyone easily hijack user accounts

Zack Whittaker @zackwhittaker / 10:22 PM GMT+2 • October 2, 2020





Image Credits: SOPA Images / Getty Images

**Grindr,** • one of the world's largest dating and social networking apps for gay, bi, trans, and queer people, has fixed a security vulnerability that allowed anyone to hijack and take control of any user's account using only their email address.



To reset a password,
Grindr sends the user an email with a clickable link containing an account password reset token.

Grindr's password reset page was leaking password reset tokens to the browser.



#### The API response to retrieve online users



```
"id": 3,
        "name": "John",
        "address": "5 George's Dock, ...",
        "id": 6,
        "name": "Jakob",
        "address": "71-75 Shelton Street, ...",
        "id": 17,
        "name": "Philippe",
        "address": "Holsbeeksesteenweg 143, ...",
16
```





If an API automatically exposes data, does it also automatically accept data?

#### The body of a legitimate request to update the user's name

```
1 {
2   "name": "Dr. Phil"
3 }
```

The API uses a framework that automatically transforms JSON data into domain objects, which are then used to update the persisted data

Without filtering the input properties, the API becomes vulnerable to mass assignment

#### The body of a malicious request to update the user's name

```
1 {
2   "name": "Philippe becomes admin",
3   "role": "admin"
4 }
```

#### The Java class of the User object

```
1 class User {
2   String name;
3   String email;
4   String role;
5 }
```

# TEST YOUR APIS IN THEIR NATURAL HABITAT



Make sure your API behaves the way you think it does. Code analysis is only one aspect. Runtime testing is necessary to get the full picture.



Is testing really the best strategy?

```
paths:
      /online/users:
        get:
          responses:
             '200':
              description: A list of online users
              content:
                 application/json:
                   schema:
10
                     type: array
11
                     items:
12
                       type: object
13
                       properties:
                         id:
14
15
                           type: integer
16
                           description: The user ID
                         name:
18
                           type: string
19
                           description: The display name of the user
```

#### **Automated IDOR Discovery through Stateful Swagger Fuzzing**



**Aaron Loo, Engineering Manager** Jan 16, 2020

they make it to production servers.

Today, we're excited to announce that we we've developed to identify Insecure Direct stateful Swagger fuzzing, tailored to supp coverage as web applications evolve.

# Scaling security coverage in a growing co empower front-line developers to be able Microsoft Research Blog

integrates with our Continuous Integration RESTIer finds security and reliability bugs through automated fuzzing

Published November 16, 2020













Research Area

Security, privacy, and cryptography



# Use Swagger/OpenAPI definitions for security



Write Swagger/OpenAPI definitions to specify the behavior of your API. Security tools consume such definitions for automatic detection and protection.

# T-Mobile Website Allowed Hackers to Access Your Account Data With Just Your Phone Number

he could query for someone else's phone number and the API would simply send back a response containing the other person's data.



## **Build Node.js RESTful APIs in 10 Minutes**

Published Jan 12, 2017 Last updated Aug 18, 2017





#### A REST API endpoint without any authorization

```
1 app.delete('/tasks/:taskId', function(req, res) {
2    Task.remove({
3         _id: req.params.taskId
4    }, function(err, task) {
5         if (err)
6         res.send(err);
7         res.json({ message: 'Task successfully deleted' });
8    });
9 };
```



Permissions on an endpoint do not suffice to stop broken object-level authorization

Checking permissions helps prevent broken function-level authorization

A REST API endpoint restricted to users with the specific "deleteTask" permission

```
app.delete('/tasks/:taskId', auth.hasPermission('deleteTask'), function(req, res) {
    Task.remove({
        _id: req.params.taskId
    }, function(err, task) {
        if (err)
        res.send(err);
        res.json({ message: 'Task successfully deleted' });
};
};
```



## **ENFORCE AUTHORIZATION AT THE FUNCTION LEVEL**



By applying a sensible permission/role check to every endpoint, unauthorized requests can be rejected before they reach the application logic

A permission check only allows authorized users to access this endpoint


such as task ownership

#### Object-level access control is often challenging to implement


impossible to audit for security

```
app.delete('/tasks/:taskId', auth.hasPermission('deleteTask'), async (req, res) => {
  let origTask = await Task.findById(req.params.taskId)
  if(auth.hasRole('employee') && !origTask.owner.id == auth.currentUser.id)
    res.status(403).send(
      { message: 'You are not a manager. You can only delete your own tasks.'});
  // Delete task
});
           Policies scattered throughout
                                                 Certain roles require
               the code like this are
                                                additional restrictions,
```











## **ENCPASULATE COMPLEX AUTHORIZATION LOGIC**



Complex authorization logic should not be scattered throughout the code, but is best defined in a clear and understandable authorization policy

# What happens when

goes wrong?



# COMPARTMENTALIZE YOUR APIS



Many APIs combine sensitive features and mundane application logic into a single service.

Compartmentalization helps limit the impact of a vulnerability.



# Now it is up to you ...

Audit your API authorization policy


Write security tests to verify authorization and JWT handling

Build OpenAPI definitions to specify the exact API behavior


• •



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# Thank you!

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